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Holistic processing is often characterized as a process by which objects are perceived as a whole rather than a
compilation of individual features. This mechanism may play an important role in the development of perceptual
expertise because it allows for rapid integration across image regions. The present work explores whether holistic
processing is present in latent fingerprint examiners, who compare fingerprints collected from crime scenes against a
set of standards taken from a suspect. We adapted a composite task widely used in the face recognition and perceptual
expertise literatures, in which participants were asked to match only a particular half of a fingerprint with a previous
image while ignoring the other half. We tested both experts and novices, using both upright and inverted fingerprints.
For upright fingerprints, we found weak evidence for holistic processing, but with no differences between experts and
novices with respect to holistic processing. For inverted fingerprints, we found stronger evidence of holistic processing,
with weak evidence for differences between experts and novices. These relatively weak holistic processing effects
contrast with robust evidence for holistic processing with faces and with objects in other domains of perceptual
expertise. The data constrain models of holistic processing by demonstrating that latent fingerprint experts and novices
may not substantively differ in terms of the amount of holistic processing and that inverted stimuli actually produced
more evidence for holistic processing than upright stimuli. Important differences between the present fingerprint
stimuli and those in the literature include the lack of verbal labels for experts and the absence of strong vertical
asymmetries, both of which might contribute to stronger holistic processing signatures in other stimulus domains.
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Fingerprints are currently matched by expert forensic
examiners and computers are typically only used to de-
velop candidates for comparison. Accuracy depends on a
number of factors, including the quality of the latent
print and similarity of the candidate exemplar as sug-
gested by a database search. Efficiency is also important,
because many state and local crime labs have long back-
logs. These criteria place great weight on the perceptual
skills of examiners, who typically undergo extensive
multi-year training protocols before they are allowed to
report conclusions for their department. Characteriza-
tions of the nature of the perceptual and decision-
making capacities have the potential to reduce errors,
improve training, and increase throughput. The current
research addresses the perceptual mechanisms that* Correspondence: busey@indiana.edu
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifsupport expert perceptual decision-making in fingerprint
comparisons. We apply a widely-used paradigm, the
composite task, because of its rich links to other do-
mains such as musical notation, faces, cars, and novel
training stimuli such as greebles. The results test the
proposition that experts utilize holistic processing when
performing rapid visual analyses of fingerprint-like stim-
uli. These findings extend the composite task to a new
set of perceptual stimuli, which helps clarify the bound-
aries between stimuli that produce evidence of holistic
processing and those that do not.Background
Fingerprints as evidence are an effective means to asso-
ciate an individual to a crime scene, in part because fin-
gerprint impressions are readily available from many
surfaces. Fingerprints are unique, even those from iden-
tical twins (Srihari, Srinivasan, & Fang, 2008). However,
each impression is also unique, due to distortion, visualis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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Because of this variation in appearance even between im-
pressions from the same finger, all testimony in court is
given by human experts. An expert must evaluate the de-
tails in agreement between the questioned and exemplar
impressions and consider the specificity of these details in
order to render one of three decisions: identification (the
two impressions are from the same finger), exclusion (the
two impressions are from different fingers), or in some
labs, inconclusive (in which no determination could be
made). Computer databases can be used to develop sus-
pects in a case, but database searches can return large
numbers of similar-looking impressions. Thus, the con-
cept of a “match” in forensic identifications actually im-
plies a form of similarity judgment, where the amount of
detail must be in sufficient agreement and provide suffi-
cient specificity for the examiner to conclude identifica-
tion. This is further complicated by the fact that an
examiner rarely has an opportunity to examine the
impressions of all other individuals who may have had
contact with a surface, which requires them to focus on
features that might be most rare (Busey, Nikolov, Yu,
Emerick, & Vanderkolk, 2016).
These considerations place a burden on the perceptual
and visual working memory capacities of human experts.
Thompson and Tangen (2014) demonstrated that the
nature of expertise among fingerprint examiners might
lie in an improved ability to discriminate subtle differ-
ences among highly similar non-mated impressions. In
their experiments, experts performed much better than
novices on a matching task with similar and dissimilar
distractors. This held even when a 5-s delay was inserted
between two sequentially presented images and inver-
sion surprisingly produced no differences in perform-
ance. However, differences between experts and novices
on a long-term memory task were mainly due to
changes in response criteria, because experts and nov-
ices showed equivalent ability to discriminate prints in a
long-term memory task. These findings argue for a
perceptual basis for the expertise, which may involve
extensive perceptual learning in order for an expert to
perform competently.
The goal of the present study is to address whether
holistic processing might be one mechanism underlying
the development of expertise in fingerprint examiners.
Holistic processing is a theoretical construct originally
used to characterize important differences between face
and common object recognition, but has since been used
more generally to characterize differences between ex-
pert and novice object recognition. While there have
been various operational definitions of holistic process-
ing empirically and these have been tied to various
mechanistic assumptions theoretically (e.g. Richler,
Palmeri, & Gauthier (2012)) they all share the intuitivenotion of processing an object as a whole rather than in
terms of its constituent parts. For expertise by finger-
print examiners, holistic processing might support the
interpretation of individual features in context with their
surroundings or allow for localization of target features
when doing visual search during a comparison. Below,
we briefly describe the process by which fingerprint ex-
aminers compare impressions, which serves to illustrate
the kind of perceptual decision-making skills that are
required. We then discuss the prior literature on the
composite task (Gauthier & Bukach, 2007; Hole, 1994;
Richler et al., 2012; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987),
which has previously been used as one important meas-
ure in holistic processing in face recognition and various
domains of expertise and which we adapted for our
participants.
In the most common framework used by examiners to
document the examination process, termed ACE-V
(Vanderkolk, 2009), evidence for agreement or disagree-
ment is collected through visual comparison of two
impressions and, if no explainable differences are found,
and the detail in agreement is considered sufficient, the
examiner will conclude “identification.” This reliance on
human expertise in comparisons has been highlighted by
recent court cases and high-profile errors, which called into
question the validity of fingerprint evidence and the ability
of experts (Cole, 2005; Kaye, 2003). One judge argued that
a lack of scientific testing and peer review in support of
fingerprint evidence should be cause for excluding
fingerprint evidence (United States v. Plaza, 2002), al-
though this opinion was later reversed by the same judge.
More recently, the National Research Council of the
National Academies of Science (2009) called for increased
standards in training and documenting the processes by
which latent print examiners conduct examinations, as well
as for error rate studies to define the limitations of the
forensic disciplines.
The most comprehensive study of error rates concluded
that while erroneous identifications were relatively rare
(about one in every 1000 non-mated pairs was called an
identification), erroneous exclusions constituted about 8%
of all mated pairs (Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts,
2011). This particular study replicated the workflow of
casework, in that it allowed examiners to say “no value”
for latent prints they deemed of insufficient quality for
comparison. As a result, the error rate they measured is
not directly comparable to that of forced-choice proce-
dures (see Thompson, Tangen, & McCarthy (2013) for
more discussion on this point). In a subsequent study, ex-
perts demonstrated fairly high reproducibility, repeating
their prior conclusion in about 90% of their decisions
(Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2012). Although
error rate studies bear on the accuracy and reliability of
examiners in conditions that are designed to approximate
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the development of expertise or offer a comparison with
laypersons to illustrate whether experts in fact differ in
their abilities.
Prior work with fingerprint examiners found evidence
for information integration across different regions using
a behavioral task that briefly presented fingerprint frag-
ments to examiners in a forced-choice design (Busey &
Vanderkolk, 2005). The accuracy results were modeled
using a probability summation model which demon-
strated that accuracy on full images was greater than
that expected from performance on the two individual
halves. These results suggest examiners may perceptually
integrate information over separate regions of an
impression when comparing fingerprints. A second ex-
periment demonstrated that the N170 component of the
EEG signal was modulated by a 180° rotation of the fin-
gerprint, which is similar to that observed when faces
are rotated. However, the evidence for holistic process-
ing in each of these experiments was somewhat indirect,Fig. 1 Four example trials with side cued as top. Each row is a trial where
possible combinations of alignment and congruency. Capital letters are use
shown in the actual stimulileaving open the question of what information is inte-
grated and whether this integration is automatic or
under voluntary control.
In the present work, we directly address the concept of
holistic processing using the composite task (Hole, 1994;
Young et al., 1987). This task measures our tendency to
process objects as a unified whole rather than a compil-
ation of individual parts and has become a common tech-
nique to assess the degree to which an irrelevant stimulus
half will interfere with the decision based on the relevant
half (Richler & Gauthier, 2014). The advantage of this ap-
proach is that allows us to infer the nature of information
integration across regions without relying on self-report
procedures. Examiners may not understand what informa-
tion they rely on, in part because it may reside below the
level of conscious awareness (Ahissar & Hochstein, 1997;
Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004).
We adapted the composite task for fingerprints as
illustrated in Fig. 1. On each trial the observer must at-
tend and encode both the top and bottom halves of athe stimuli are presented in sequence from left to right. This shows all
d to label the halves for added clarity in this example but were not
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mask and then a second fingerprint is presented. One
half is cued during the mask and second image and
the observer must respond “same” or “changed” to
only the cued half. If the to-be-ignored half is still
automatically processed to the point of making a
separate “same”/“changed” decision, this decision may
facilitate the response to the cued half (if the decisions
for each half are congruent) or interfere with the re-
sponse to the cued half (if the decision for each half
are incongruent). Thus, if the participant is processing
the image holistically to the point where he or she
cannot ignore the uncued half, we will see perform-
ance differences between trials where the two halves
have decisions that are congruent verses incongruent.
Of course, successfully ignoring the uncued half will
eliminate the facilitory or inhibitory effects, resulting
in no performance difference between congruent and
incongruent trials.
As a further test of holistic processing, half of the tri-
als have test images that are misaligned, as shown in
rows 3 and 4 of Fig. 1. Here we assume that the phys-
ical misalignment breaks the gestalt cue of continuity
and the perceptual grouping of the two halves, poten-
tially disrupting holistic processing and therefore redu-
cing the interference from the uncued to-be-ignored
half (Richler, Mack, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2009). Other
forms of misalignment, such as the background color of
the stimulus, have also been shown to disrupt holistic
processing (Curby, Goldstein, & Blacker, 2013). This
would produce similar performance between congruent
and incongruent trials, because the congruent trials no
longer benefit from facilitation from the uncued half.
The combination of large congruency effects for
aligned trials and small congruency effects for misa-
ligned trials results in a central signature of holistic
processing in the composite task: a congruency × align-
ment interaction. This interaction is typically measured
with d’ (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004) by combining
the accuracy from same and changed trials using trad-
itional signal detection theory approaches. The exact
nature of this interaction will depend on whether mis-
alignment also produces a performance decrement or
whether partial integration still occurs during the misa-
ligned condition. The expected signature of holistic
processing is greater performance differences between
congruent and incongruent trials for the aligned trials
when compared with the difference between congruent
and incongruent trials for the misaligned trials.
Why might we expect holistic processing with fin-
gerprints in our latent print examiners? While holistic
processing as measured by the composite task was
originally characterized as a face-specific mechanism,
there is now ample evidence that holistic processingreflects certain classes of perceptual expertise more
generally. For example, holistic processing has been
observed with expertise for a range of objects such as
musical notation (Wong & Gauthier, 2010) and cars
(Curby et al., 2013) and develops in the laboratory
with expertise for novel objects (Gauthier & Tarr,
2002). The exact mechanisms underlying the emer-
gence of holistic processing in various domains of ex-
pertise is the subject of continued debate, with the
nature of the interference argued to lie somewhere
between a purely perceptual (e.g. template match) ac-
count and a purely cognitive (e.g. decision conflict)
account, and may rely on the allocation of attention
across the two halves (Richler et al., 2012).
Why might we not expect holistic processing? One
common feature of domains of expertise that have
shown holistic processing is that they require people to
individuate objects, which often involves learning
names of individuals (Chua, Richler, & Gauthier, 2015;
Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009). Naming is a natural
part of many forms of expertise (e.g. car or bird experts
or familiar face recognition). However, fingerprints are
rarely named, other than broad classifications based on
their overall pattern type (e.g. whorl or arch). The
present experiments use an over-learned stimulus set
(at least for experts) for which naming is not an inte-
gral component of their expert behavior. We avoid any
broad naming based on pattern type because when we
changed one or both halves of the image, we always re-
placed the half with the same pattern type (left or right
loop); naming at the pattern type level could not con-
tribute to performance in our task.
To test holistic processing with fingerprint exam-
iners, we used the composite task with artificial finger-
print images that are similar to fairly high quality
casework images. We chose these images because we
did not want subjects to use irrelevant dimensions such
as deposition pressure or amount of ink to make same/
changed decisions. We ran the composite task on
experts and novices using upright fingerprints (Experi-
ment 1) and then tested a new set of experts and
novices with inverted fingerprints (Experiment 2). Our
results demonstrate the conditions under which con-
gruency effects are observed (or not) by using stimuli
that are overlearned but not typically named by
examiners. We also address the practical question of
whether holistic processing plays a significant role in
fingerprint expertise and our comparisons with novices
document the degree to which any holistic processing
effects are specific to experts. This latter question has
implications for the debate about whether examiners
have true expertise to contribute beyond showing the
images to the jury, as well as how they might attain
their superior performance.
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Participants
We used two between-subject conditions (expertise and
orientation) and as a result there were four different
groups of subjects. For Experiment 1, we recruited 14
fingerprint examiners (age range, 31–56 years; mean age,
38.3 years) from one regional, five state, and eight metro
forensic science laboratories. Their years of experience
were in the range of 5–15 years, with a mean of 8.4 years
and an interquartile range of 6–10 years. The novice
group for Experiment 1 was made up of 16 people from
the Bloomington, Indiana community, but data from
one were excluded due to poor accuracy, resulting in 15
people (age range, 18–63 years; mean age, 34.9 years).
For Experiment 2, an additional group of 13 fingerprint
examiners (age range, 31–62 years; mean age, 40.3 years)
were recruited from six state and six metro agencies and
one national forensic science lab, with their average
years of experience in the range of 2–31 years, with a
mean of 9.3 years and an interquartile range of 4–12
years. Another group of 15 novices (age range, 20–58
years; mean age, 35.3 years) were recruited from the
Bloomington, Indiana community. All of the novices
across both experiments had no prior experience with
fingerprints, while experts were required to have at least
two years of unsupervised casework experience. All par-
ticipants were asked to not participate if they were un-
able to read the text at their comfortable viewing
distance. The novices received US$10 in compensation.
Stimuli
The stimuli for both experiments were composed in the
same way, but in Experiment 2, all stimuli were rotated
180°.
Figure 1 illustrates the stimuli used on various trials.
The program SFinGe, a synthetic fingerprint generator
(Cappelli, Lumini, Maio, & Maltoni, 2007), was used to
create a database of 20 left loop fingerprints and 20 right
loop fingerprints. We used synthetic fingerprints because
real fingerprints have variations in the texture and ink
deposition that are idiosyncratic and not particularly
relevant during fingerprint comparisons. The SFinGe
program has been used to create large databases of stim-
uli to test automated fingerprint identification systems
and it has generally been accepted in certain roles as a
proxy for real fingerprints.
These images were cut into two halves and the halves
were recomposed in various different combinations to
create composites, which were randomized for every
trial. The randomization was done so that it was not
possible for the top and bottom of the same print to ap-
pear together on any study or test image. To accomplish
this, four separate images were chosen for each trial. If
both top and bottom images did not change, only twoimages were actually used. If only the top or bottom
changed, a third image was used to create the changed
half. If both the top and bottom changed, parts of all
four images were used to create the study and test im-
ages. These four images were always drawn from either
the pool of left loops or right loops in order to preserve
the overall appearance of a reasonable fingerprint.
A horizontal gray bar, 20 pixels wide, was centered be-
tween the two halves to mask the disparities between
their ridges. The MATLAB program then added a black
bracket cue to either the top or bottom of all the test
images and randomly determined if the test image was
to be misaligned or aligned. This cue also appeared on
the mask. For the misaligned images, the top half was
shifted to the right by approximately 35% of its width
and the bottom half was shifted to the left by 35% of its
width. In the case of Experiment 3, the whole image was
rotated 180°, but this was done before the addition of
the black cue bracket. The final images were grayscale
562 × 640 pixel .jpeg files. A mask and a fixation point
were also created with the same dimensions. These im-
ages were saved to the server and loaded by a Javascript
program to display the trials, as described below.
Procedure
The experiment was administered entirely online so we
could recruit fingerprint examiners from across the
country. Novices also participated using the same online
system, either using their own computers or sometimes
coming into our laboratory to complete the study on
our computer for convenience. Using Javascript, PHP,
and HTML, the website was set up so participants could
log in using a unique ID and password and complete the
study at any pace they desired. All groups of participants
performed the same task and all had the option to pause
and resume the study at any point.
After a participant logged in, they were presented with
a detailed page of instructions, an optional instructional
video, and a mandatory set of 16 practice trials to ac-
quaint them with the task. The instructional video did
not provide extra information beyond the written in-
structions; however, participants were encouraged to
watch it for further clarification. During a follow-up
email, no participants expressed confusion over the pro-
cedures of the task. We used the jsPsych library (de
Leeuw, 2015) to present the trials within Javascript. For
each trial, the participant was shown a study image for
800 ms (2000 ms if it was a practice trial), then a ran-
dom pattern mask for 500 ms, and finally a test image
that was shown until the participant responded. If their
response took longer than 2500 ms, the participant was
cautioned and asked to respond faster on subsequent tri-
als. Internal timing within Javascript captured the display
durations, which was used to screen out computers with
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cluded for this reason). The process and layout of the
trials is visualized in Fig. 1.
A black bracket would first appear on either the top or
bottom of the mask and then continue to show for the
test image, cueing the participant on which half to at-
tend to. Participants were asked to make a response,
“same” or “changed,” based on whether the cued half of
the test image was the same or different from the study
image. The study image would always be aligned and the
test image would be either aligned or misaligned. This
response was then recorded to a MySQL database via
PHP and the next trial would begin. The participant
would receive feedback after every 16 trials, telling them
the percent of answers they got correct during these re-
cent trials. There were 20 trials for each combination of
cued half (top or bottom), trial type (match or non-
match), side congruency (congruent or incongruent),
and alignment (aligned or misaligned), resulting in 320
trials total. These trials do not include the 16 practice
trials that participants were given during instruction;
however, within the practice trials each combination of
the four conditions was presented once. The order of
conditions during the trials was randomized and condi-
tions were not blocked. We allowed the participants to
stop at any particular trial and resume the study at their
leisure.The task
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were both 2 × 2 × 2
mixed designs, where the within-subjects factors were
side congruency (congruent or incongruent) and alignment
(halves were aligned or misaligned). The between-subjects
factor was expertise (expert or novice). Experiments 1 and
2 were differentiated only by the orientation of the finger-
prints (upright for Experiment 1 or inverted for Experi-
ment 2) and this manipulation was also between-subjects.
Based on the composite task, the halves of the stimuli
were congruent if the decision (“same” or “changed”) for
the uncued half was the same as the decision for the
cued half. The halves were incongruent if they led to dif-
ferent decisions and according to the logic of the com-
posite task, this incongruency should cause the uncued
half to interfere with the cued half if the image is being
processed holistically. Note that “congruency” here refers
to the decisions for the two halves, not whether either
was changed. For example, if both the cued and uncued
halves changed, this would still be considered a congru-
ent trial because the decision is the same for both the
cued and uncued halves. The misaligned images should
in theory hinder any holistic processing and reduce the
interference of the incongruent side, due to the in-
creased physical disjunction of the two halves.Results and discussion
Results for the composite task are typically presented in
terms of accuracy (d’) and reaction time, with accuracy
receiving more attention in the literature. We computed
d’ in the same way for each combination of alignment
and congruency, by calculating the normal-transformed
hit rate (the proportion of times each participant said
“same” when the ground truth was “same”) and subtract-
ing from it the normal-transformed false alarm rate (the
proportion of times each participant said “same” when
the ground truth was “changed”). Although participants
were cautioned to respond faster if their response took
longer than 2500 ms, we did not exclude these trials
from analysis. Such trials represented only 2.3% of the
overall dataset, but five subjects out of our entire set of
57 subjects had greater than 10% of their trials fall into
this category. If these trials are excluded, we find similar
results to those reported below with the exception of the
experts-only congruency by alignment interaction in
Experiment 1.
Experiment 1: upright fingerprints
Sensitivity (d’)
The two top panels of Fig. 2 show the d’ value for each
of the four conditions (two levels of alignment crossed
with two levels of congruency) separated into two graphs
by expertise. The standard marker of holistic processing
is a relatively large difference between the congruent
and incongruent d’ values when the halves are aligned,
and a reduced difference when the halves are misaligned
(Richler & Gauthier, 2014). In other words, the incon-
gruent, task-irrelevant halves should interfere with
performance more when the halves are aligned than
when they are misaligned.
A repeated-measures, mixed-factor 2 (congruency:
congruent, incongruent) × 2 (alignment: aligned, misa-
ligned) × 2 (expertise: expert, novice) analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) was performed for experiment 1. The
ANOVA revealed a strong main effect of expertise with
F1,27 = 7.98, MSE = 1.042, p < 0.01, and ηp
2 = 0.228, con-
firming that experts are more sensitive to the task over-
all. There was a main effect of congruency (F1,27 = 15.21,
MSE = 0.308, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.360), and this effect was
not different between experts and novices (F1,27 = 0.091,
MSE = 0.308, p = 0.765, ηp
2 < 0.01) and a main effect of
alignment (F1,27 = 38.93, MSE = 0.195, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.590),
which was also not different across experts and novices
(F1,27 = 0.295, MSE = 0.195, p = 0.591, ηp
2 = 0.011). These
main effects of congruency and alignment, where d’ is gen-
erally lower in all incongruent trials and in all trials where
the test image is misaligned, are consistent with other work
involving the composite task (Chua et al., 2015; Richler,
Bukach, & Gauthier, 2009; Richler, Mack, Palmeri, &
Gauthier, 2011). There was a trend-level interaction between
Fig. 2 d-prime (sensitivity) values for both experiments. The two top panels represent Experiments 1 (upright prints) and the two bottom panels
represent Experiment 2 (inverted prints). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals computed from the standard error of the mean
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p= 0.063, ηp
2 = 0.122), but this slight interaction was not
significantly different across expertise (F1,27 = 0.572,
MSE = 0.110, p = 0.456, ηp
2 = 0.021). A significant inter-
action between congruency and alignment signifies hol-
istic processing in the composite task and one priori
hypothesis was that this interaction would vary across la-
tent fingerprint expertise. Separate two-way ANOVAs were
done to unpack the expert and novice groups, which re-
vealed a small but significant interaction between congru-
ency and alignment for experts (F1,13 = 5.000, MSE = 0.077,
p = 0.0435, ηp
2 = 0.278).1 We found no significant inter-
action between congruency and alignment for novices
(F1,14 = 0.564, MSE = 0.080, p = 0.465, ηp
2 = 0.039). How-
ever, given a lack of significant three-way interaction be-
tween congruency, alignment, and expertise, the significant
two-way interaction between congruency and alignment for
experts and the lack of thereof for novices should not be
viewed as compelling evidence for differences in holistic
processing due to expertise in upright fingerprints.
Response bias (criteria)
The two top panels of Fig. 3 show the response bias (criter-
ion) values for Experiment 1 in both experts and novices.
Criterion was calculated by normal-transforming the resultof 1 minus the false alarm rate for each condition. The pre-
dictions for the holistic model are less clear for the criteria
values, in part because they depend on complex factors
such as probability matching (the tendency for participants
to want to give an equal rate of “same” and “different” re-
sponses over the course of the experiment), which can
interact with shifting underlying distributions as demon-
strated by differences in d’. However, they do document
whether participants tend to adopt more liberal or conser-
vative response strategies for different levels of congruency
or alignment. We performed a similar three-way ANOVA
on criteria and only found a main effect of expertise with
F1,27 = 8.44, MSE = 0.478, p < 0.01, and ηp
2 = 0.238. An add-
itional ANOVA on the log beta values revealed no main
effect for expertise however, showing that experts were
more conservative primarily because they also had higher
d’ values and adjusted their criteria accordingly.
Response times
The two top panels of Fig. 4 show the mean reaction times
for all trials in each of the eight conditions for Experiment
1. Holistic processing is sometimes observed in response
times, but not always (Curby et al., 2013; Wong et al.,
2009). Examining response times also demonstrates when
participants may have made speed/accuracy tradeoffs.
Fig. 3 Criteria plotted for both experiments. The two top panels represent Experiments 1 (upright prints) and the two bottom panels represent
Experiment 2 (inverted prints). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals computed from the standard error of the mean
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(F1,27 = 17.102, MSE = 14911, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.388) and a
trend-level effect of expertise (F1,27 = 3.003, MSE = 295695,
p = 0.094, ηp
2 = 0.100). There were no significant interactions
between any variables (all p values > 0.15). The lack of inter-
actions suggests that participants did not operate in vastly
different speed/accuracy tradeoff regimes.
Summary
Overall, there is weak evidence for holistic processing as
an element of expertise matching upright fingerprints.
Although the interaction between congruency and align-
ment for d’ may appear stronger for experts, there was
no significant difference when compared with the novice
interaction. As expected, experts are better at the task in
general, but this is difficult to attribute to holistic pro-
cessing. These results contrast with other domains such
as musical notation (Wong & Gauthier, 2010), cars
(Curby et al., 2013), faces (Richler & Gauthier, 2014),
and novel objects (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002), which dem-
onstrated clear evidence for holistic processing.
Experiment 2: inverted fingerprints
As a further test of the hypothesis that fingerprint
examiners would demonstrate holistic processing forfingerprints, we repeated Experiment 1 with a new
group of experts and novices, but instead used inverted
stimuli. Stimulus inversion is commonly used to disrupt
holistic processing, as seen in the familiar Thatcher
Illusion (Thompson, 1980). However, even with faces,
the effects of inversion remain somewhat complicated,
with some authors arguing that inversion does not
qualitatively change the nature of perceptual processing
(e.g. Sekuler, Gaspar, Gold, and Bennett, 2004). Richler
et al. (2011) manipulated exposure duration and inver-
sion of faces to identify the time-course of holistic
processing effects and found that holistic processing
was present for inverted faces but that it emerged later
compared to upright faces. With fingerprints, Thompson
and Tangen (2014) manipulated orientation and found no
performance difference during a 60-s side-by-side com-
parison of fingerprints corrupted by noise. This result
seems in contrast to from the conclusion drawn by
Busey and Vanderkolk (2005), who argued that finger-
print inversion produced changes in the N170 compo-
nent that were consistent with those seen when faces
are inverted.
Experiment 2 is designed to assess whether inversion
affects the holistic processing of fingerprints by experts
specifically with the composite task, so it replicated and
Fig. 4 Mean response times plotted for both experiments. The two top panels represent Experiments 1 (upright prints) and the two bottom
panels represent Experiment 2 (inverted prints). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals computed from the standard error of the mean
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fingerprints. Otherwise all procedures were identical.
Sensitivity (d’)
The two bottom panels of Fig. 2 show the d’ value for
each of the four conditions separated by expertise. A
clear interaction is present in the expert data, where
misalignment completely eliminates any interference
caused by the incongruent un-attended half. The
repeated-measures, mixed-factor 2 (congruency: congru-
ent, incongruent) × 2 (alignment: aligned, misaligned) × 2
(expertise: expert, novice) ANOVA confirmed this result.
With inverted fingerprints, there was only a trend-
level effect of expertise with F1,26 = 3.424, MSE = 1.442,
p = 0.076, and ηp
2 = 0.116. There was a main effect of
congruency (F1,26 = 29.586, MSE= 0.200, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.532)
and this effect was not different between experts and novices
(F1,26 = 0.422, MSE = 0.200, p = 0.522, ηp
2 = 0.016) and a
main effect of alignment (F1,26 = 22.673, MSE = 0.126,
p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.466), which was also not different
across expertise (F1,26 = 0.903, MSE = 0.126, p = 0.351,
ηp
2 = 0.034). These main effects of congruency and
alignment are very similar to Experiment 1.
There was a significant interaction between con-
gruency and alignment (F1,26 = 16.204, MSE = 0.110,p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.384) and a trend-level interaction be-
tween congruency, alignment, and expertise (F1,26 = 4.207,
MSE = 0.110, p = 0.050, ηp
2 = 0.139) which supports our
initial observation of the graphs. Recall that this three-way
interaction between congruency, alignment, and expertise
that is predicted by the holistic processing hypothesis (and
was not significant in Experiment 1). To specify the exact
interaction that varies across expertise, we again divided
the three-way ANOVA into separate two-way ANOVAs
by expertise. For the expert group, there was a signifi-
cant interaction between congruency and alignment
(F1,12 = 23.924, MSE = 1.896, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.666); for
the novice group, there was not a significant inter-
action between congruency and alignment (F1,14 = 1.692,
MSE = 0.231, p = 0.214, ηp
2 = 0.108). With inverted finger-
prints, we see that experts find it more difficult to ignore
the task-irrelevant half when it is incongruent and conflicts
with the response they should be making, leading to a de-
crease in d’ for those trials. When the halves are misaligned,
however, this interference is eliminated as shown in the
lower-left panel of Fig. 2. This interaction was not present
in novices and our three-way ANOVA confirms this with
the trend-level interaction (p = 0.050). Possible reasons of
this stronger interaction for inverted prints compared to
upright prints are discussed in the “General discussion”.
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The two bottom panels of Fig. 3 show the response bias
(criterion) values for Experiment 2 in the eight condi-
tions. We performed a similar three-way ANOVA on
criteria and found a main effect of congruency with
F1,26 = 9.836, MSE = 0.086, p < 0.05, and ηp
2 = 0.274. No
additional main effects or interactions between any vari-
ables were found (p values all > 0.32).Response times
The two bottom panels of Fig. 4 show the mean reac-
tion times for all trials for each of the eight condi-
tions for Experiment 2. The three-way ANOVA
showed the main effect of alignment (F1,26 = 31.857,
MSE = 7778, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.551) and an interaction
between congruency and alignment (F1,26 = 7.573,
MSE = 23987, p = 0.011, ηp
2 = 0.226), but this inter-
action did not interact with expertise (F1,26 = 0.018,
MSE = 3167.5, p = 0.895, ηp
2 < 0.01). This interaction
shows that both novices and experts were faster when
the halves were both congruent and aligned. There
were no other main effects or significant interactions
between any variables (all p values > 0.27).Cross-experiment analysis
We examined d-prime values once more with a repeated
measure, mixed-factor 2 (congruency: congruent, incon-
gruent) × 2 (alignment: aligned, misaligned) × 2 (expertise:
expert, novice) × 2 (orientation: upright, inverted) ANOVA
to look for effects and interactions across Experiments 1
and 2. There was a between-subjects main effect of
expertise (F1,53 = 10.496, MSE = 1.238, p < 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.165), but no main effect of orientation (F1,53 = 1.008,
MSE = 1.238, p = 0.320, ηp
2 = 0.019). This is consistent
with Thompson and Tangen (2014), who also found no
effect of inversion on the accuracies of experts or
novices. There was also a main effect of congruency
(F1,53 = 41.462, MSE = 0.255, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.439) and a
main effect of alignment (F1,53 = 61.022, MSE = 0.161, p
< 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.535) as well as an interaction between
congruency and alignment (F1,53 = 17.891, MSE = 0.110,
p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.252). While this is consistent with the
holistic processing hypothesis, combining across both
upright and inverted fingerprints, the congruency by
alignment by expertise three-way interaction was only of
trend-level significance (F1,53 = 3.974, MSE= 1.110, p= 0.051,
ηp
2 = 0.070), which can be interpreted as weak support for
holistic processing as a function of expertise. Aside
from a trend-level interaction between alignment
and orientation (F1,53 = 3.224, MSE = 0.161, p = 0.078,
ηp
2 = 0.057), there were no other main effects or in-
teractions between factors (p > 0.13).Conclusions
In Experiment 1, we measured holistic processing in ex-
perts and novices for upright fingerprints and found no
significant difference between the groups. In Experiment
2, we measured holistic processing for inverted finger-
prints to test if inversion could affect holistic processing
and found that the interaction between congruency,
alignment, and expertise was stronger than what was ob-
served with upright fingerprints. The cross-experiment
analysis revealed trend-level interactions that provide
weak support for holistic processing as a function of ex-
pertise, because the congruency by alignment interaction
of experts is only marginally greater than the same inter-
action in novices.
Despite this relatively weak support for holistic pro-
cessing in experts being significantly greater than that in
novices, there is still support for holistic processing in
the experts alone. The unpacked ANOVAs show that
the signature congruency by alignment interaction is
present in experts for both upright and inverted prints,
which is consistent with other domains of expertise like
musical notes, faces, or cars. Novices may also show
some evidence for holistic processing as evidenced by
the slight non-parallelism in the right panels of Fig. 2,
which may be sufficient to reduce the congruency by
alignment by expertise interaction to trend level. Novices
may have some level of natural expertise when it comes
to fingerprints. Additionally, SFinGe generates the fin-
gerprints with a standard oval shape, giving them an
overall form-factor that is similar to what participants
may be used to processing in faces. These factors may
contribute to the relatively small differences between ex-
perts and novices in holistic processing. SFinGe also
generates impressions that lack strong cues to orienta-
tion that are produced by pressure differences and the
lack of these cues may have resulted in experts relying
on different features than they would for natural prints.
Given that our results show only modest levels of hol-
istic processing across expertise and that inversion did
not have the usual effect, one possibility is that finger-
print experts may not utilize the same perceptual mech-
anisms as experts in other domains. The most apparent
difference between fingerprint examination and other
domains is that fingerprint experts do not typically name
or individuate specific fingerprints outside their basic
pattern class (such as loop or whorl). Cars can be indi-
viduated by the model, type, and style, faces can be rec-
ognized based on the name of the person and other
attributes such as gender or race, and even made-up
novel objects such as greebles or ziggerins are named as
a test for perceptual expertise. In addition, holistic
effects may only occur if the training is face-like, as op-
posed to letter-like (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Wong et al.,
2009). Fingerprints are different in that they are an over-
Vogelsang et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:15 Page 11 of 12learned area of expertise that does not require naming
and, as a result, holistic processing as it is defined by the
composite task may be less pronounced. An alternative
hypothesis we cannot exclude is that our sample size
was not large enough to produce robust evidence for
holistic processing differences due to expertise.
Why might we see stronger evidence for holistic pro-
cessing for inverted stimuli relative to upright stimuli?
Given that the literature suggests we find the opposite, we
have no clear account. However, besides the usual possi-
bility of sampling error, we do note that experts encounter
fingerprints in various orientations during casework. They
usually immediately orient them upright and then spend a
great deal of time looking at the upright version. However,
most of the exposure to upright prints involves the en-
gagement of more localized feature processing such as
minutiae comparisons, which could be a more analytic
process based on local features. However, inverted finger-
prints usually involve the extra step of first orienting the
print. The appearance of an inverted fingerprint might en-
gage a more holistic process that is involved in deciding
whether and how to orient the print to an upright state.
At this point, such an account must remain somewhat
speculative as the literature does not offer a precedent for
stronger holistic effects for inverted stimuli.
Taken together, the present results generalize the
range of tasks where holistic processing has been mea-
sured and indicate differences between fingerprint exam-
ination and other domains of expertise.
The results also have implications for practitioners.
We see overall better performance on the task for ex-
perts than novices, which is consistent with perceptual
expertise for these examiners. Even though these holistic
effects appear relatively weak, they may still contribute
to an examiner’s expertise in extended casework com-
parisons by facilitating rapid integration across image re-
gions and this is consistent with the idea that fingerprint
examiners have expertise to share during a trial that goes
beyond the perceptual processing skills of a novice
sitting on a jury. However, examiners should be careful
not to assume that these perceptual skills make them
invulnerable to errors or replace the hard work of
detailed and lengthy perceptual examinations of some
latent prints.
Endnotes
1This interaction was the only result that was affected
when excluding trials with response times greater than
2500 ms. It became trend-level significant (F1,13 = 3.504,
MSE = 0.093, p = 0.0839, ηp
2 = 0.212).
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